A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of web-based experiments, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of five network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In contrast with previous theoretical work, we found that network topology had no significant effect on average contributions. This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not benefit from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which artificial seed players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that although players do generally behave like conditional cooperators, they are as likely to decrease their contributions in response to low contributing neighbors as they are to increase their contributions in response to high contributing neighbors. Second, we found that positive effects of cooperation are not contagious. In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-based experiments over those conducted in physical labs.
Introduction
Why, and under what conditions, presumptively selfish individuals cooperate is a prevailing question in social science that has stimulated an extraordinary range of explanations, many of which have focused on the strategic benefits of cooperation. For example, although displays of altruism may appear to run counter to an individual's self-interest, it is possible to show that if one assumes that individuals possess sufficiently strong other-regarding preferences, then altruism may in fact convey selfish benefits as well [9] . Moreover in a social context, behavior that appears purely altruistic may also accrue individual benefits either because others explicitly reward pro-social behavior [29, 34] or punish selfish behavior [3, 8, 4, 13] . Finally, individuals may be rewarded indirectly for cooperating, either because a good reputation conveys other transactional benefits [23] , or because altruistic behavior can be viewed as a signal of reproductive fitness [11] .
In addition to explanations that focus on individual strategies, a longstanding idea is that cooperative behavior might arise as a consequence of the population structure itself [14] . Although initially proposed in the context of evolutionary biology, this idea has particular relevance for social dilemmas among human actors, where the total population is large, but the effects of any one individual's actions fall disproportionately on a relatively small set of neighbors determined either by spatial or social proximity. For example, smog or acid-rain causing pollutants disproportionately impact geographically proximate populations; whereas by contrast, the benefit derived from social networking sites (e.g. Facebook) is highly dependent on the activities and contributions of one's immediate social acquaintances. Because in either case an individual's neighbors are themselves connected to others, who are in turn connected to others still, and so on, the dynamics of social dilemmas can be thought of as taking place on extended networks [24, 33] . In these settings outcomes of interest, such as aggregate levels of cooperation, plausibly depend on the structure of the network as well as on the strategies of the individuals in the population [25] .
There are two main reasons to think that network structure should impact cooperation. The first reason is that many theoretical models of social dilemmas assume that cooperation is conditional, in the sense that an individual will only cooperate on the condition that its partners are also cooperating. Arguably the clearest example of the principle of conditional cooperation is the celebrated Tit-For-Tat strategy, which has consistently been shown to outperform more exploitative strategies in a range of simulation studies, in large part because it performs well when interacting with other cooperative strategies [2] . In addition, related strategies have also been proposed that generalize the idea of conditional cooperation to multi-player settings [37, 12] , usually by specifying some form of threshold requirement-i.e. "I will cooperate if at least X of my neighbors cooperated last round, else I will defect." Regardless of the specifics of the rule, the implication of these results for networks is that networks characterized by high levels of local clustering, meaning that an individual's neighbors are also likely to be neighbors of each other, ought to sustain higher aggregate levels of cooperation than populations in which individuals are randomly mixed [1] .
The second reason to suspect that network structure should impact cooperation is that cooperation in networks might be "contagious." Specifically, if A is a conditional cooperator surrounded mostly by cooperating neighbors, A will cooperate more; but then A's increased cooperation may cause its remaining neighbors to cooperate more as well. These neighbors may in turn cause their neighbors to cooperate more as well, and so on, leading to a cascade of cooperation that sustains itself over multiple steps. In fact, recently it has been claimed that cooperation is characterized by a "three degrees of influence" rule [10] , meaning that an individual who increases his or her level of cooperation can exert a positive impact on the inclination to cooperate of an individual who is three steps removed from them in the network. Because the number of individuals who can be reached within three degrees of a cooperating individual will in general depend on the non-local structure of the network [36] , this rule, if true, would imply that network features other than local clustering should also impact aggregate cooperation levels.
Consistent with these arguments, simulation studies of social dilemmas on spatial lattices [26, 22] , and more recently on networks [37, 6] , have indeed found that under certain conditions network structure can determine cooperation levels. However, these results necessarily depend on numerous modeling assumptions regarding the behavioral strategies of individual players. Because so many strategies are conceivable, and because the success of conditional cooperation depends on what other strategies are present, it is ultimately inconclusive what can be learned from simulation studies about how real human players will interact in networks. Human subjects experiments, meanwhile, are difficult to conduct, in large part because in order for networks to differ in interesting ways they must be sufficiently large; thus each experiment requires many subjects to participate simultaneously. Although a number of "networked games" experiments have been conducted in recent years [17, 18, 19, 5] , they have generally focused on other games, like graph coloring [19] , consensus [18] , and economic exchange [17] . Meanwhile, laboratory studies of cooperation have largely focused on interactions between pairs [30] , or within small, completely connected groups [21, 20, 7] . Thus the question of how network structure impacts cooperation among humans subjects remains poorly understood.
Experimental Setup
To investigate the effects of network structure on cooperation, we conducted a series of web-based experiments, using Amazon Mechanical Turk (henceforth AMT, http://www.mturk.com), in which n = 24 participants played a widely studied variant of a social dilemma, called a public goods or common pool resource game [28, 27] . Typically such games last for a number rounds, where in each round individuals make voluntary contributions to a common pool. The pool is then augmented in some manner, reflecting the added benefits of the public good. After augmentation the pool is then redistributed to the players, where all players receive an equal share regardless of their contributions. Although many specific variants of this general class of games have been proposed [27] , we studied a standard one in the experimental literature [21, 20, 16] defined by the payoff function π i = e i − c i + a k+1 j∈Γ(i) c j where π i is the payoff to individual i, e i is i's endowment, c i is i's voluntary contribution, a is the amount by which collective contributions are multiplied before being redistributed, Γ(i) is the network neighborhood of i, which we define to include i itself, and k is the vertex degree (all nodes in all networks have the same degree). Critically, when 1 < a < n, meaning that the marginal per capita return M = a k+1 , lies in the range 0 < M < 1, players face a social dilemma in the sense that social welfare is maximized when all individuals contribute the maximum amount, but players have a selfish incentive to "free ride" on the contributions of others.
Recruiting and Retention
AMT and other web-based experimental platforms are becoming increasingly popular with behavioral science researchers, in part because they allow experiments to be run faster and more cheaply, and in part because they afford access to potentially a much broader cross-section of the population than is typical of university-based lab experiments. A major challenge faced by web-based experiments, however, is the difficulty of implementing designs that require many participants to arrive at the same time, and then to remain in the experiment for its full duration. Previous web-based experiments have avoided these issues by adopting asynchronous designs that do not require large groups of subjects to participate at the same time. In [31] , for example, participants arrived sequentially, and only saw information about the behavior of previous participants; while in [35] , at most pairs of participants were required to be present simultaneously. In our experiment, by contrast, we require all players to participate simultaneously-a problem that is solved in physical labs by announcing official start times and supervising experiments with trained proctors.
Because it is impossible to ensure that participants will arrive at precisely the same time, and also because different participants require more or less time to read the instructions and pass the quiz (see SI), we created a virtual waiting room. Once they had accepted the task and passed the quiz, participants saw a screen informing them that the experiment had not yet filled, along with how many remaining players were required. Once all positions had been filled, participants in the waiting room were informed that the game was about to commence. In order to keep the waiting times reasonable, we also created a standing panel of 152 players, recruited from the series of preliminary experiments, described below. All experiments on which our main results are based were conducted using this panel (For further details see the SI and Table S1 therein for the self-reported demographic composition of the panel); thus ensuring that all players had played previously and understood the instructions (i.e. they qualified as "experienced" players, consistent with previous work [20] ).
Results
Before proceeding with our main results, we first address a second methodological question facing web-based experiments-namely whether or not subjects playing at home or at work behave systematically differently from those playing in a physical lab, and thus whether or the results obtained in different contexts are comparable. To address this issue, we conducted a series of 24 prelimi- [7] . (B) Contributions for different compensation levels. In both panels error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. nary experiments that were designed to replicate the conditions of a previous lab-based study [7] : specifically, (a) we arranged the players in completely connected groups (cliques) of n = 4 (equivalent to k = 3); (b) we set M = 0.4, and (c) we ran each experiment for 10 rounds, where the first two rounds each lasted 45 seconds and all subsequent rounds lasted 30 seconds. The main difference between our design and that of [7] was that in the latter, participants received e i = e = 20 points endowment per round, whereas our participants received e = 10. In both cases, however, participants contributed 0 ≤ c i ≤ e points per round, where in any given round all participants were required to enter their contribution for that round. At the end of each round, each player received the following information: (a) their contribution for that round, (b) the contributions of each of their neighbors for that round, and (c) their own cumulative payoff up to that point. The information visible to players is shown in Figure  S2 of the SI.
Normalizing for the different endowments, Figure 1A shows striking agreement between the two sets of results; where we note that qualitatively similar average contribution levels have also been found in other experimental studies [20] . We also checked that observed contributions were not sensitively dependent on the precise conversion rate between points (as allocated in the game) and dollars, by conducting an additional series of 16 experiments which varied the compensation between $0.01 per point and $0.005 per point (participants were also paid a fixed up-front fee of $0.50 for accepting the task and passing the quiz). As Figure 1B shows, contribution levels for both compensation levels were similar. 
Networks
In all subsequent experiments, subjects were assigned to one of the five networks shown in Figure 2 , where otherwise the experiments were identical to those described above. All networks comprised n = 24 players, each with constant vertex degree k = 5, but spanned a wide range of possible structures. In particular, we varied three frequently studied structural parameters, summarized in Table 1 : (a) the clustering coefficient C =
where K i is the number of completed triangles in node i's neighborhood; (b) the average path length L = d ij where the average distance between all pairs of nodes is taken over each connected component; and (c) the diameter, which is the distance between the farthest two nodes, D = max d ij . The clustering coefficient of node i is computed by dividing the number of triangles incident on i by the number of triangles possible given i's degree. It is a local measure of structure which captures the extent to which the neighbors of i are also neighbors of each other. The clustering coefficient of a network is the average clustering coefficient of the nodes. The average path length and diameter are global network measures which quantify the extent to which effects can propagate along chains of network ties. Thus our choice of topologies was specifically designed to highlight the importance of both conditional cooperation and contagion.
In the first set of network experiments all positions in the network were filled by human players recruited from AMT. Because individual contributions tend to vary considerably from one experiment to the next, and different players are likely to play at different times of day, we conducted multiple realizations of the experiment for each topology (see Table S3 of the SI). The order and timing of experiments was randomly varied between realizations. In total, we conducted 23 experiments over a period of 8 weeks. Figure 3 shows the average contribution for each round, for each of the five topologies. Visually, the average contribution follows a very similar pattern regardless of the network topology-a result that is confirmed by a Kruskal-Wallis test [32] on round-by-round contributions, which found no significant differences (the smallest P-value is for round 8: H=6.43, df=4, P=0.17). In addition to considering differences in aggregate contributions, we also checked for differences between topologies both at the level of individual nodes, and for individual "groups" defined as the nodes that are assigned to the same cliques in topology 1. We found that high contributions are not more likely to cluster in groups that are characterized by high internal density of Each seed node is color-coded, and nodes connected directly to a given seed are outlined with the same color. All nodes in all networks are directly connected to exactly one seed node, except for Random Regular where two nodes are each directly connected to two seed nodes (green double circles) and two nodes are not directly connected to any seed node (orange rectangles). In light of the theoretical arguments above [37, 26, 22, 6] , these results are surprising. Specifically, intuition and simulation results suggest that when conditional cooperators are allowed to interact preferentially, i.e. in networks that exhibit high clustering, they ought to reinforce each other, thereby sustaining higher contributions for longer than in randomly connected networks which have low clustering. Likewise, the contagion argument suggests that clusters of high contributors ought to exert a positive impact on the contributions of neighbors who are not in the cluster, thereby promoting the spread of cooperation. If in fact, network structure does not impact contributions, then one or both of these two arguments must be invalid. To differentiate between these possible explanations, we conducted two additional series of experiments, which we describe in turn.
Testing for Conditional Cooperation
In the first series, comprising 30 experiments over 4 weeks, we followed the same design as above, but with the key difference that in each experiment four nodes were selected, one from each group (indicated with a filled circle in Figure 2 ), and their contributions were all artificially fixed either at 10 (the "cooperative" condition) or 0 (the "defection" condition) for all rounds (i.e. these players were played by a computer, not by subsidizing real players). In this manner, we were able test the conditional cooperator hypothesis by directly measuring the positive/negative influence of unconditional cooperators/defectors on their immediate neighbors. We note that with the exception of the random regular network, the seed players were arranged in order to cover the network, meaning that each human player was adjacent to precisely one seed player; in addition, each human player was connected via two-step paths to all four seed players (in the random regular case, a perfect cover arrangement did not exist for the selected network; thus a close approximation was used instead). An advantage of this arrangement, which we call the "cover" condition, is that all human players were subjected to the same experimentally manipulated influence, both direct and indirect. Figure 4A shows that in all topologies, the presence of cooperating seeds stimulated consistently higher aggregate contributions from the remaining 20 players, while the presence of defecting seeds had the opposite effect. Possessing a high (or low) contributing neighbor therefore did increase (or decrease) the average contribution levels; thus our subjects were indeed behaving as conditional cooperators. Nevertheless, Figure 4B shows that the effect of the seed players is not consistently bigger in the graphs with the highest clustering. For example the effect of the seed nodes in the Cliques network, which has the maximum number of triangles incident on each node, is very similar to the effect of the seeds nodes in the Random Regular network, which has fewer than 1/10th as many triangles. So two nodes that form a triangle with a cooperating (or defecting) seed do not have an appreciably larger (or smaller) average contribution level then two disconnected nodes with a cooperating (or defecting) seed neighbor in common. Mutual reinforcement of the contributions among the neighbors of a seed node is largely absent, whether or not there is an edge between the neighbors.
Is there in fact any effect of increasing the number of triangles in the network? To answer this question, Table 2 compares the difference in contributions of pairs of players that (a) are adjacent versus not adjacent, and (b) share a positive or negative seed as a neighbor versus no neighboring seed. Comparing the left column to the right column shows that adding an edge to a disconnected pair of edges increases the similarity between their contribution levels. It also shows that completing a triangle between two human players and a seed node also increases the similarity of the contributions of the humans. Thus, increasing the number of triangles in the network does not have a substantial impact on average cooperation levels, but it does increase coordination within the neighborhoods of the seeds. We emphasize, however, that the coordinating influence of triangles cuts both ways by increasing contributions in the presence of cooperating neighbors and diminishing them in the presence of defecting neighbors. In turn, this result suggests an explanation for the absence of topological effects: players do cooperate conditionally, but conditional cooperation has negative effects as well as positive effects, and these effects cancel out independently of local clustering. 
Testing for Contagion
As noted above, another possible explanation for the lack of impact of network topology on aggregate contributions is the absence of contagion. That is, even if players do behave as conditional cooperators, both with respect to the artificial seeds and also the other neighbors of seeds, possibly these effects are not strong enough to propagate beyond the immediate neighborhood of a cooperation seed. Unfortunately, the above experiment allows us to draw only limited conclusions regarding contagion. Since the cover arrangement of seeds meant that all human players were subjected to the same potential influence, both direct and indirect, we did not experimentally manipulate the level of positive/negative influence at different distances from human players.
To further test for the possibility of contagion, therefore, we conducted a third series of 20 experiments over 2 weeks, in which we kept the number of unconditionally cooperating seeds constant at four per network (we did not introduce unconditional defectors in these experiments), but concentrated them together into two adjacent pairs (see Figure S11 of the SI for the details). This arrangement of seeds, which we call the "concentrated" condition, therefore exposed some human players to two unconditional cooperators as immediate neighbors, while others were not exposed to any seeds directly, but were connected indirectly to the seeds via a human intermediary. Since the cliques topology did not allow for this type of arrangement so we excluded it from these experiments. If positive contagion were present in the network, we would expect to see nodes at distance two from the seeds increase their contributions relative to the all-human (i.e. no seeds) condition. Moreover, the premise of conditional cooperation would also lead us to expect that immediate neighbors would increase their contributions relative to the cover-seed condition. Surprisingly, our results contradicted both these expectations. First we found that nodes who were directly connected to two cooperating seed nodes contributed an amount between the contributions of players who are not attached to any seed nodes and the contribution of players who are attached to only one seed node (both computed from previous experiments) as shown in Figure 5A . These results suggest that although many players do respond positively to the introduction of unconditional cooperators, the presence of too many unconditional cooperators invites free riding. Conditional cooperation, that is, appears to be subject to at least two distinct conditions that are in tension with one another: on the one hand, individuals do not want to contribute unless others are contributing; but on the other hand, if others contribute too much the temptation to free ride overrides their inclination to reciprocate.
In spite of this result, it is nevertheless the case that immediate neighbors of cooperating seeds do on average contribute more than in the no-seed condition. Assuming that the remaining players (i.e. at distance two from the seeds) also cooperate conditionally, one would expect that the increased contributions associated with the neighbors of a fully contributing seed would generate contagious effects leading to increased contributions among these nodes as well. Yet these effects are not apparent. Quite to the contrary, in fact, Figure 5B shows that the two-step neighbors of the cooperating seeds contributed slightly less than the nodes in the corresponding network positions contributed in the all-human experiments.
To check that this unexpected reduction in contributions did not reflect a systematic overall shift from higher to lower contributions over the course of dozens of experiments involving the same players, we ran an additional series of all-human experiments, finding that average contributions had, if anything, increased slightly relative to the earlier round of all-human experiments (see Figure S12 of the SI). We also studied average contributions as a function of the number of games played by individual subjects, finding that experienced players who have played as many as 40 games do not contribute on average, more or less than inexperienced players (see Figure S13) . Moreover, we do not find noticeably more unconditional defectors in the concentrated seed experiments than in the all human experiments (see Figure S14 ), nor do we see obviously greater concentration of unconditional defectors in the non-seed clusters (see Figure S15 ). Thus we conclude that the reduced contributions observed in the concentrated seed experiments are not explainable either in terms of a systemic over-time shift in player behavior, the presence of experienced players contributing less, or the network position of humans who unconditionally defected.
Discussion
Returning to our original motivation, theoretical arguments in favor of an association between network structure and cooperation invoke two related ideas: first, that individuals are conditional cooperators, increasing their contributions in response to the increased contributions of their neighbors; and second, that positive effects of conditional cooperation should propagate through the network via a process of contagion, leading some authors to claim the existence of a "three degrees of influence" rule. In this paper, we have tested the effects of network topology on contribution levels in a standard public goods game, finding no significant effects. In addition, we conducted two separate rounds of experiments-one to test for the presence of conditional cooperation, and the other to test for the possibility of positive contagion. Although we do find strong evidence of conditional cooperation, we do not find evidence of positive contagion.
Our explanation for these results is that the theoretical arguments cited above emphasize the positive aspect of conditional cooperation, yet conditional cooperation implies not only that players increase their contributions in response to cooperative neighbors but also that they decrease their contributions in response to defecting neighbors. While it is the case that highly clustered networks offer more opportunities for positive effects to reinforce each other than random networks, they also offer more opportunities for negative effects to reinforce each other as well. By contrast, in random graphs where there is very little clustering neither cooperation nor defection get reinforced and seeds act as influence blockers preventing either positive or negative influence from propagating among neighbors.
These observations also show how an outside entity might stimulate cooperation in a network by subsidizing targeted individuals to cooperate or by inserting unconditionally cooperative players into the network. We emphasize that unlike other known strategies for stimulating cooperation, such as allowing punishment [8] , allowing reward [23] , or introducing sanctioning institutions [13] , this mechanism does not change the game by giving players another action, but instead exploits the network on which the game is being played. As Table 1 shows, in the cover experiments the positive intervention was cost-effective in four out the five topologies. More specifically, the expected cost of subsidizing players, i.e. the additional contributions of the four seeds over their average contribution in the no-intervention case, was less than the total marginal increase in contributions from the remaining twenty individuals. These results therefore provide empirical support for earlier theoretical work [15] which proposed that seeding or inducing cooperation among focal actors may generate positive effects on the network. Our work also suggests where to place the seed nodes for maximum effect. The absence of positive contagion-along with the negative marginal effect on neighbors of multiple unconditionally cooperating seeds-implies that the impact of cooperative seeds is maximized by spreading them widely across many groups, thereby maximizing the total number of human players exposed directly to seeds.
In concluding, we note that in addition to their substantive relevance, the experiments discussed here also demonstrate the possibility of web-based behavioral experiments involving the simultaneous presence of many players. Although experiments of this nature and scale have been conducted in physical labs [17, 18, 19, 5] , web-based "virtual labs" exhibit two important advantages over their physical counterparts: first, experiments can be run faster and more efficiently (e.g. we ran 113 experiments costing roughly $1.50 per subject per experiment); and second, although our panel size restricted the current study to networks of n = 24, in principle this limit can be raised arbitrarily, allowing for the study of much larger networked systems. The speed, efficiency, and scalability of web-based experimentation should allow researchers to extend the current study in numerous directions: how would contributions be affected by (a) giving players more information about the network; (b) providing players with feedback; (c) allowing players to rewire their network ties? And how do all these effects scale with the size and density of the network? In addressing these questions, and others, we anticipate that web-based platforms like that provided by AMT will become an increasingly valuable tool for understanding the dynamics of human cooperation, and for experimental social science in general. 
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Introduction to Amazon Mechanical Turk
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) is a web-based labor market, originally created to facilitate "crowd sourcing" (1, 2) of tasks, called "human intelligence tasks," or HITs, that are easier for humans than for machines-for example, image labeling, sentiment analysis, or classification of URL's. In addition to its role as a labor market, AMT can also be thought of as a convenient pool of subjects willing to participate in laboratorystyle behavioral experiments for a relatively low fee (where the nature of the experiments are appropriately disclosed). Recently, behavioral science researchers have begun to view AMT in this manner, and a number of experiments have now been conducted(3-5).
The AMT community comprises two types of actors: "requestors," who can be individuals or corporations, and can list jobs along with a specified compensation; and "turkers" or "workers", individuals who then elect to complete any number of these tasks for which they are then paid by the corresponding requestor.
When choosing a task to work on, turkers are presented with a list of jobs which are subdivided into HITs. Each job contains the title of the job being offered, the reward being offered per HIT, and the number of HITs available for that job. Turkers can click on a link to view a brief description of the task, or can request a preview of the HIT. After seeing the preview, turkers can choose to accept the HIT, at which point the work is officially assigned to them and they can begin completing the task.
HITs range widely in size and nature, requiring from seconds to hours to complete, and compensation varies accordingly, but is typically on the order of $0.01-$0.10 per HIT. Currently, several hundred requests may be available on any given day, representing tens of thousands of HITs (i.e. a single request may comprise hundreds or even thousands of individual HITs). AMT also provides a convenient API for transferring payments from requestors to workers.
Designing Synchronous Games
Although AMT and other web-based experimental platforms are becoming increasingly popular with behavioral science researchers, the bulk of previous work has relied on experimental designs that are asynchronous, in the sense that they do not require a large group of subjects to participate at the same time. In (6), for example, participants arrived sequentially, and only saw information about the behavior of previous participants; while in (7), at most pairs of participants were required to be present simultaneously. In our experiment, by contrast, we require all n = 24 players to participate simultaneously. As described in the main text, we instituted three design features to solve this problem:
The "Waiting Room." Because it is impossible to assure that participants will arrive at precisely the same time, and also because different participants require more or less time to read the instructions and pass the quiz (see below), we created a virtual "waiting room." Once they had accepted the HIT and passed the quiz, participants saw a screen informing them that the experiment had not yet filled, along with how many remaining players were required. Once all positions had been filled, participants in the waiting room were informed that the game was about to commence.
Constructing a panel.
In a series of preliminary experiments, we learned that simply posting the HIT on AMT was insufficient to fill n = 24 networks in a reasonable time, resulting in participants abandoning the waiting room and the HIT being terminated. To alleviate this problem, we ran a series of experiments with n = 4, 6, 8 , for which waiting times were reasonable, and then at end of each experiment, allowed to opt-in to being notified of future runs of our experiment. To speed up building this panel, in roughly half of these experiments we only allowed players who had never played the game before. In this manner, we created a standing panel of 152 players, all of who had played previously and understood the instructions (i.e. they qualified as "experienced" players, consistent with previous work (8)). All n = 24 experiments reported here were conducted using this panel. The selfreported demographic composition of the panel is reported in Table S1 .
Notifications
The evening before any experiments were to be held, we sent messages to the panel (via AMT), informing them what time the experiments would be. The experiments were commonly held at 11am, 1pm, 3pm and 5pm EST, although other times of day were used in a few instances. We also posted the time of the next days experiments on turkernation.com, a bulleting board site for turkers. At one of these times a worker would log in to AMT and then accept the HIT for entitled "The Investment Game". Once they did so, the first 24 players to read the following instructions and pass the quiz at the end of it were allowed to enter the experiment. 
Handling Dropouts
In spite of these precautions, individual participants would occasionally fail to enter a contribution on one or more turns; or leave the game entirely. In rare instances, a participant who had accepted the HIT and passed the quiz did not participant at all in the game. To handle these circumstances, we adopted the following rules:
1. If a player had entered at least one contribution, if they subsequently failed to enter a contribution, the system would automatically enter the same contribution as their previous round.
2. If a player did not enter an initial contribution, the system would random choose a contribution of either 0 or 10 for that player.
To avoid biasing our results, we only used data from a given realization if it met both of the following two criteria: 1) at least 90% of the contributions in the entire experiment were made by players and 2) for each player, at least half of the contributions were made by the player. As a result we discarded 5 of the n=4 realizations with repeat players, 17 of the n=4 realizations with fresh players, 9 of the n = 24 human realizations (no seed players), 8 of the n=24 experiments with seed players in the cover arrangement, and 4 of the n=24 experiments with seed players in the concentrated arrangement.
Participant Instructions and Quiz
After accepting the HIT, participants were provided with the following instructions (adapted from (9)), and were required to pass a quiz, thus demonstrating that they had understood the instructions. In order to avoid biasing participants towards cooperation, we avoided using the term "public goods game," instead calling it "The Investment Game." Preliminary results (reported in main text) showing that our system closely replicated the results of (9) suggest that the change of name had no effect.
Welcome to the Investment Game!
Because the amount of money you can earn depends on your decisions in the game, it is important that you read these instructions with care. At the end of the instructions there is a quiz to ensure that you understand the instructions. You will not be paid for the HIT unless you correctly answer these questions.
Overview:
In the Investment Game you will be placed in a network with 5 other Turkers; however, you will only "see" a subset of the total network-those players to whom you are connected directly. These players will be called your "neighbors". Both the total network and your neighbors will remain fixed throughout the game.
Once the network is populated with Turkers, the game will proceed over the course of 10 "rounds". During each round you, and your neighbors (i.e. the Turkers directly connected to you in the network) will choose how much to contribute to an abstract project. Then this project generates a "payoff" that will then be split equally among you and those who are directly connected to you. Your total payoff for the game is the sum of your payoffs from each round.
During the game we will not report your earnings in terms of dollars and cents but rather in terms of points. At the end of the game the total amount of points you have earned will be converted to dollars at the rate of 1 point = 2 cents. The amount you earn from the game will be the bonus for this HIT. You will earn the base rate of base rate of 25 cents for this HIT by correctly answering the quiz at the end of these instructions.
How the game works:
1. In each round we give you an "endowment" of 10 points. 2. You decide how many points you want to contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 and 10 in the input field and then clicking the submit button. Please note that by deciding how many points to contribute to the project, you also decide how many points you keep for your self, this is (10 -your contribution) points. Also note that once you have submitted your contribution you cannot go back and change it. 3. In the first two rounds you have 45 seconds to make you contribution. In the remaining rounds you have 30 seconds. If you do not make a contribution before the end of a round, the system will make one for you and you will not earn any points for that round. 4. Your income from each round consists of two parts:
a. the points which you have kept for yourself ("income from points kept"). b. "income from the project", which is 0.4 x the total contribution that you and your neighbors made to the project. Your income in points from a round is therefore: Income from points kept + Income from the project = (10 -your contribution to the project) + 0.4*(total contributions you and your neighbors made to the project) 5. The income of each person in the network (including your neighbors) is calculated in the same way.
Screenshot:
Four Examples of Payoffs:
1. Suppose you have four (4) neighbors, and each of you contributes the maximum allowable of 10 points. The sum of the contributions you and your neighbors (those who are directly connected to you) is 50 points, and so each member of the group receives an income from the project of: 0.4*50 = 20 points. Meanwhile your income from points kept = 0 (because you did not keep any), and so your total income = 0 + 20 = 20 points. 2. Alternatively, suppose that each player contributes two (2) points. Then the total contribution to the project is 10 points, and each member of the group receives an income from the project of: 0.4*10 = 4 points. Because you contributed two of these points then your income from points kept is eight (8) , and your total income = 8 + 4 = 12 points. 3. Next, say you contribute two (2) points and all your neighbors contribute ten (10) points, the total contribution is 42 points, and the income that each player receives from the project is 0.4*42 = 16.8 points. Because you contributed two (2) points, your kept income is eight (8) , and your total income = 8 + 16.8 = 24.8 points. 4. Finally, say you contribute ten (10) points, and all your neighbors contribute two (2) points, the total contribution is 18 points, and the income that each player receives from the project is 0.4*18 = 7.2 points. Because you contributed ten (10) points, your kept income is zero (0) points and your total income = 0 + 7.2 = 7.2 points.
Important Points to Note:
1. For each point that you decide to keep for yourself, your income for that round will increase by one point. 2. For each point you contribute to the project, the total contribution to the project will rise by one point, and your income from the project will rise by 0.4*1 = 0.4 points. 
Quiz
To make sure you have read and understood the instructions, you must answer the following questions correctly. If you answer any questions incorrectly, you will get a second chance. If you answer a question incorrectly twice, you will not be allowed to play the game and will not receive payment for the HIT. The answers to all of the questions below are in terms of points. Please accept the HIT before beginning to fill out the form. 
Game Play
As described in the main text, each experiment ran for 10 rounds, where the first two rounds each lasted 45 seconds and all subsequent rounds lasted 30 seconds. During a given round all participants were required to enter their contribution for that round. At the end of each round, each player received the following information: (a) their contribution for that round, (b) the contributions of each of their neighbors for that round, and (c) their own cumulative payoff up to that point. The information visible to players is shown in Figure S2 , which was also shown to the players in the game instructions. 
Main Experiments
Of the experiments conducted using the networks shown in Figure 2 (where n=24), 23 were conducted using all human players (i.e. with no artificial seed players) and another 50 experiments were conducted with 4 artificial seed players and 20 human players. The breakdown of realizations per topology is given in Table S3 . The larger number of cycle topology experiments was due to the presence of two outliers: experiments in which the first round contributions were uncharacteristically high. The effect of these outliers was to greatly increase the size of the error bars for that topology; thus more realizations were required. Testing for Group and Individual-Level Effects
As described in the main text, we did not find significant differences in aggregate contributions across the five topologies. In order to further examine this result, we also looked at contributions at the level of groups and individuals. By "group" here we mean the set of nodes that belong to the same clique in Topology 1 (see colors in Figure S4 ). As Figure S4 indicates, these groups become progressively less meaningful as the clustering coefficient diminishes: in the Random Regular topology, two nodes in the same group (same color) are no more likely to be connected than nodes of different groups. In spite of these topological differences, however, Figure S5 indicates that they do not impact contributions; specifically, the fraction of groups contributing at least X in a given round is similar for all topologies, and over all rounds. Finally, Figure S6 shows the full distribution of individual level contributions for the five topologies (color coded) over all ten rounds. Although all distributions change dramatically over the course of the game (reflecting the average decline in contributions seen in Figure 3 , main text) the changes are similar for all topologies. Thus we conclude that topology does not exert a noticeable impact on contributions at any level: individual, group, or aggregate. 
Comparison of Results with Cassar (2007)
Cassar (10) conducted a total of 11 n-player prisoner dilemma experiments 1 on networks of players, where the networks were varied between the following three topologies:
1. A "local" network on which individuals were arranged on a cycle, and each individual was connected to their two nearest and two next-nearest neighbors (i.e. k = k = 4 for all i ) 2. A "small-world" network in which a small fraction of the edges in the cycle were rewired (hence k = 4 , but individual k varied) 3. A "random" network in which individuals were randomly connected (again,
Three realizations of each topology were tested; thus clustering coefficient varied between , depending on topology, and path length varied between , where the "local" topology had the highest and ; the "random" topology had the lowest; and the "small-world" topology was intermediate.
Cassar's main results were:
1. Cooperation in the small-world topology was significantly lower than either the local or the random topology (Table 5, p. 224) 2. In a logit model, the terms for C and L were negative and positive respectively, and both were significant (Table 10 , p. 227)
At first glance, these findings appear to contradict our own findings; however, closer inspection suggests that the reported significance is questionable 2 .
First, we note that the differences reported as significant in Cassar's Table 5 are between cumulative contributions, over the 80 rounds of the experiments. Yet as noted in our main text, and also by Cassar (see her Footnote 13), contributions that start high tend to stay high, suggesting that contributions across consecutive rounds are unlikely to be independent. Combining contributions over many rounds, therefore artificially amplifies 1 Cassar also conducted 10 coordination game experiments on the same three topologies for a total of 21 experiments; however the coordination results are not relevant to the current comparison, so we only discuss her results for the 11 PD games 2 We also note that another possible explanation for the difference in results is that the game studied by Cassar was slightly different from the one studied here: strictly speaking it was an n-player prisoner's dilemma game, not a linear public goods game. In theory, however, these two games have been shown to be equivalent (2); thus we should not expect to see qualitative differences between them. Moreover, if such subtle changes in the game can qualitatively change the impact of networks, the robustness of all such results is called into question.
the differences, leading to the appearance of statistical significance, where none may exist. For this reason, we study round-by-round differences, not cumulative differences. In fact as the table itself makes clear, the final (and also average) difference between topologies is roughly the same as the initial difference (period [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Thus essentially all of the difference can be explained in term of initial contributions, which are by construction unrelated to the network topology. In fact, as we show for our own results in Figure S7 , shifting the contribution curves vertically in order that they have the same initial value further diminishes the apparent differences between topologies.
Second, the significance of the NetworkClustering and NetworkLength coefficients in the PD1 logit model (Table 10 ) is marginal p < 0.05 ( ) and disappears when other factors, such as the % cooperation in the previous experiment (PD2) or dummy variables for the session (PD3) are included. If simply controlling for the session in which a game was conducted eliminates the significance of a coefficient, then it would seem that any claims to significance ought to be regarded with caution 3 .
Noting that our experiments involve more realizations (23 vs. 11) of larger networks ( vs. ) over a wider range of C and L, we therefore are led to the surprising, but simpler conclusion that neither clustering nor path length appears to have a significant impact on cooperation.
Intervention Experiments: Cover Arrangement
As described in the main text, we conducted a series of experiments in which four "seed" nodes were selected and their contributions artificially fixed at 10 or 0 for the duration of the game. The nodes chosen are indicated by the filled circles in Figure 2 of the main text. Figure S8 shows the results of these experiments for each topology. Figure S9 shows the same data as Figure S8E except that all the curves are shifted so that they start at the same point. In all of these plots the dashed green curves with open circles show the average contribution levels of the human players with seed nodes contributing the full amount of 10. The solid black curves show the average contribution levels of the experiments with all human players. The dotted blue curves with solid triangles show the average contribution levels of the human players with the seed nodes contributing 0.
Figures S8 and S9, along with Figure 4 of the main text, all show that (a) "cooperative" seed nodes contributing 10 in general cause the human subjects to increase their contribution levels; and (b) "defecting" seed nodes contributing 0 cause the human subjects to decrease their contribution levels. Figure S10: Cooperating seeds increase the probability of nodes contributing 10 and decrease the probability of nodes contributing 0. Defecting seeds decrease the probability of nodes contributing 10 and increase the probability of nodes contributing 0. 
Intervention Experiments: Concentrated Arrangement
